These notes are the result of some work done a year or two ago on the Medicean MS. of Aeneas Tacticus1 in preparation for an edition of that unduly neglected author which I hope will soon see the light. I should not have thought it worth while to publish them separately were it not for two papers, at once laborious and brilliant, read by Mr. A. C. Clark to the Oxford Philological Society on the text of Cicero′s speeches, in May, (...) 1912, and February, 1913. The extreme plausibility with which the reader then explained numberless corruptions, transpositions, etc., in the text of Cicero, by reconstructing the length of line and pagination of the MSS. in their several degrees of descent, led me to think that it might be of some interest to publish the results at which I arrived by working on the same lines with a Greek author. In my case the problem has been a far simpler one, as I only had one MS. to deal with; but as I came to my own conclusions quite independently, before I knew that the method was being applied elsewhere, I give them for what they are worth, only too glad to find myself in such good company. (shrink)

The literature on human mate preferences is vast but most data come from studies on college students in complex societies, who represent a thin slice of cultural variation in an evolutionarily novel environment. Here, I present data on the mate preferences of men and women in a society of hunter-gatherers, the Hadza of Tanzania. Hadza men value fertility in a mate more than women do, and women value intelligence more than men do. Women place great importance on men’s foraging, (...) and both sexes rate character as important. Unlike college students, Hadza men place considerable importance on women being hard-working, and Hadza women cite looks about as often as men do. (shrink)

At least since Anaximander’s apeiron, there have been philosophical questions about what, if anything, preceded the gods. But, as far as I know, the precise question that I address in this essay was first explicitly asked by Ronald W. Hepburn, in his essay ‘Restoring the Sacred: Sacred as a Concept of Aesthetics’. In his essay, Hepburn is interested in the actual and potential relationships between religious and aesthetic uses of the concept of the sacred. Which leads him to the question: (...) Does the concept have a valid meaning – an aesthetic meaning, say – that is logically independent of (and therefore might have preceded) the religious one, which seems most strongly associated with the metaphysical belief that God or the gods exist? In other words, is the sacred older than the gods? While he does not provide a definitive answer, Hepburn adumbrates his view on whether this claim is correct. In this essay, I set out my own answer within the guidelines that Hepburn’s sketch has laid out. (shrink)

Since the discovery of the first man‐ape, many have assumed that the earliest humans were hunters and that this was associated with a “killer instinct.” The myth of “man the hunter” was repeated in the 1960s in anthropology texts and popular literature. In the 1970s it was adopted by sociobiologists to explain human nature. “Man the hunter” is used to explain not only human biology but also human morality. The morals described, however, often reflect ancient beliefs and appear (...) to be new ways of justifying old morality codes. The newest version of this myth is presented in a recent book, Demonic Males. I will discuss various accounts of this myth and the evidence used to justify them, and will specifically critique the arguments presented in Demonic Males. (shrink)

Human societies are examined as distinct and coherent groups. This trait is most parsimoniously considered a deeply rooted part of our ancestry rather than a recent cultural invention. Our species is the only vertebrate with society memberships of significantly more than 200. We accomplish this by using society-specific labels to identify members, in what I call an anonymous society. I propose that the human brain has evolved to permit not only the close relationships described by the social brain hypothesis, but (...) also, at little mental cost, the anonymous societies within which such alliances are built. The human compulsion to discover or invent labels to “mark” group memberships may originally have been expressed in hominins as vocally learned greetings only slightly different in function from chimpanzee pant hoots (now known to be society-specific). The weight of evidence suggests that at some point, conceivably early in the hominin line, the distinct groups composed of several bands that were typical of our ancestors came to be distinguished by their members on the basis of multiple labels that were socially acquired in this way, the earliest of which would leave no trace in the archaeological record. Often overlooked as research subjects, these sizable fission-fusion communities, in recent egalitarian hunter-gatherers sometimes 2,000 strong, should consistently be accorded the status of societies, in the same sense that this word is used to describe tribes, chiefdoms, and other cultures arising later in our history. The capacity of hunter-gatherer societies to grow sufficiently populous that not all members necessarily recognize one another would make the transition to larger agricultural societies straightforward. Humans differ from chimpanzees in that societal labels are essential to the maintenance of societies and the processes giving birth to new ones. I propose that anonymous societies of all kinds can expand only so far as their labels can remain sufficiently stable. (shrink)

Strong reciprocity is an effective way to promote cooperation. This is especially true when one not only cooperates with cooperators and defects on defectors (second-party punishment) but even punishes those who defect on others (third-party, “altruistic” punishment). Some suggest we humans have a taste for such altruistic punishment and that this was important in the evolution of human cooperation. To assess this we need to look across a wide range of cultures. As part of a cross-cultural project, I played three (...) experimental economics games with the Hadza, who are hunter-gatherers in Tanzania. The Hadza frequently engaged in second-party punishment but they rarely engaged in third-party punishment. Other small-scale societies engaged in less third-party punishment as well. I suggest third-party punishment only became more important in large, complex societies to solve more pressing collective-action problems. (shrink)

Parallels in anatomy between humans and domesticated mammals suggest that for the last 300,000 years, Homo sapiens has experienced more intense selection against the propensity for reactive aggression than any other species of Homo. Selection against reactive aggression, a process that can also be called self-domestication, would help explain various physiological, behavioral and cognitive features of humans, including the unique system of egalitarian male hierarchy in mobile hunter-gatherers. Here I review nine leading proposals that could potentially explain why self-domestication (...) occurred in H. sapiens, whether by selecting in favor of cooperation and tolerance or by selecting against aggressiveness. To account for the domestication syndrome, proposals must explain what led to a decline in fitness of highly aggressive males, and why the explanatory factor applies only to H. sapiens rather than to other species of Homo. The proposed explanations invoke genetic group selection; group-structured culture selection (also known as cultural group selection); social selection by female mate choice; social selection by male partner choice; increased self-control; cooperative breeding; high population density; use of lethal weapons; and language-based conspiracy. Most proposals face difficulties in accounting for the origins and/or maintenance of self-domestication. I conclude that the evolution of language-based conspiracy, which is a form of collective intentionality, was the key factor initiating and maintaining self-domestication in H. sapiens, because it is the most convincing mechanism for explaining the selective pressure against individually powerful fighters. Sophisticated language enabled males of low fighting prowess to coordinate in executing physically aggressive and domineering alpha males. This system is known today as a leveling mechanism in small-scale societies. Group-structured culture selection possibly accelerated the process. (shrink)

I submit the need to establish a comparative study of societies, namely groups beyond a simple, immediate family that have the potential to endure for generations, whose constituent individuals recognize one another as members, and that maintain control over access to a physical space. This definition, with refinements and ramifications I explore, serves for cross-disciplinary research since it applies not just to nations but to diverse hunter-gatherer and tribal groups with a pedigree that likely traces back to the societies (...) of our common ancestor with the chimpanzees. It also applies to groups among other species for which comparison to humans can be instructive. Notably, it describes societies in terms of shared group identification rather than social interactions. An expansive treatment of the topic is overdue given that the concept of a society (even the use of such synonyms as primate “troop”) has fallen out of favor among biologists, resulting in a semantic mess; while sociologists rarely consider societies beyond nations, and social psychologists predominantly focus on ethnicities and other component groups of societies. I examine the relevance of societies across realms of inquiry, discussing the ways member recognition is achieved; how societies compare to other organizational tiers; and their permeability, territoriality, relation to social networks and kinship, and impermanence. We have diverged from our ancestors in generating numerous affiliations within and between societies while straining the expectation of society memberships by assimilating diverse populations. Nevertheless, if, as I propose, societies were the first, and thereafter the primary, groups of prehistory, how we came to register society boundaries may be foundational to all human “groupiness.” A discipline-spanning approach to societies should further our understanding of what keeps societies together and what tear them apart. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 103-104 [Access article in PDF] Robert Boyle. Correspondence of Robert Boyle. 6 vols. Edited by Michael Hunter, Antonio Clericuzio, and Lawrence M. Principe. London: Pickering & Chatto, 2001. Cloth, $795.00. A complete edition of Boyle's correspondence has long been needed. Up until now, scholars who have attempted to incorporate Boyle's correspondence into their work have been thwarted by (inter alia) (...) illegible handwriting, foreign languages in the seventeenth-century versions, and scattered correspondence across a number of different countries on at least two continents. Michael Hunter and his co-editors, Antonio Clericuzio and Lawrence Principe, along with help from a staff of translators and editorial assistants, have succeeded brilliantly in creating order out of chaos.Given the length of time that Hunter et al. have been working on this edition and the extent to which cooperation has been sought and given by Boyle scholars worldwide, this Correspondence is as complete as is humanly possible. It is likely that in coming years stray letters will be found (most likely in private collections), but such finds will not be due to these editors' having failed to search assiduously for all extant correspondence. Next to completeness, the editorial methods and scholarly apparatus determine the usefulness of such an edition, and here again, Hunter and his co-editors have performed faultlessly. Hunter's introduction explains fully the decisions that were made concerning editorial choices (such as the choice of copy texts, etc.). In the letters themselves, the editorial annotations are easy to follow and arranged in such a way as to present a relatively uncluttered text (with textual variants being consigned to a section at the end of each volume). Editorial footnotes have been clearly distinguished from authorial footnotes. The editors have been quite successful in identifying correspondents and have provided useful cross-references in the footnotes to other relevant materials. In addition, each volume contains a section of brief biographical entries for those correspondents whose letters occur frequently in that volume.The editors' annotations are detailed and helpful and reflect years of dedication to the search for relevant information concerning Boyle's interests and his contemporaries. Throughout the entire Boyle Project, Hunter has elicited input from Boyle scholars on various people, topics, and references, and (as is the case with Boyle's Works) the result is an amazing amount of complementary information.Correspondence in a foreign language appears in both the original and in translation. This makes it possible for a scholar without competence in, for example, early modern Latin to have access to the content of the correspondence while allowing other scholars to check the accuracy of translations for themselves.Perhaps most useful of all the scholarly apparati is the glossary that appears at the end of each volume. Here one may find the meanings of the many seventeenth-century terms that are opaque to the typical twenty-first-century reader. Given the extent of Boyle's involvement in alchemy, without this glossary and its identification of the many alchemical terms it would be virtually impossible for a modern reader (even one who has studied chemistry) to make sense of many of the letters. Credit in this case goes to Lawrence Principe, who has contributed the fruit of his years devoted to the study of medieval and early modern alchemy. [End Page 103]A personal note from the reviewer may help to emphasize the significance of the contribution that Michael Hunter and his associates have made to Boyle studies. When I first began dealing with the (at that time) unpublished sources available to Boyle scholars, the situation was one of almost complete chaos. I was fortunate enough to have access at that time (1990-91) to Hunter's "Finding List" to the sources available at the Royal Society of London. This was surely an advantage over previous scholars, who could only pick their way through the many volumes looking for information that might be relevant to their studies; even so, progress in pursuing a particular aspect of Boyle scholarship was tedious. Cross-references to related... (shrink)

My hope has been to persuade readers that Hobbes's mighty thought experiment of the state of nature distorts our conceptual learning because it ignores the second morality. Instead, it inflates the first morality as the whole of morality. This inflation arises from Hobbes's exclusive preoccupation with universalizable reason. As important as universal reason undeniably is, it does not encompass the whole of moral reality. To suppose that it does is to distort moral reality. Like so many Enlightenment figures, Hobbes would (...) have political theory be more like logic than life.To refer once again to the Enlightenment allows me to observe that the drive to universality through reason is a distinctive feature of European civilization. To proceed along this line might lead to the conclusion that the pursuit of the universal is a cultural artifact. It is itself culturally relative. I am in no position to argue that point here at the end of the day, but did not the universal criteria propounded by the Enlightenment prove serviceable in the justification of European imperialism? By the universal standards of the Enlightenment only Europe was civilized.Reason is often a weapon. Alasdair MacIntyre has termed the search for rationality in moral philosophy a masquerade. MacIntyre sees the quest for rationality to be a quest for authority. He cites John Maynard Keynes's observations that “in practice, victory [in moral argument] was with those who could speak with the greatest appearance of clear, undoubting conviction and could best use the accents of infallibility.” Rationality is a weapon. “In moral argument the apparent assertion of principles functions as a mask for expressions of personal preference.” Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue, 2nd ed. (London: Duckworth, 1985), pp. 9, 17, and 19. Seasoned participants in academic conferences and learned seminars realize the intensity of involvement in what Sheila Ruth has called “The Hunt.”Sheila Ruth, “Methodocracy, Misogyny, and Bad Faith,” Men's Studies Modified, Dale Spender (ed.) (Oxford: Pergamon, 1981), p. 48. The speaker is the quarry. The others, the auditors are the hunters. Some are accomplished, others are not yet blooded. They wait for the weak point. It's blood. They attack. The inexperienced hunters are enthusiastic. The seasoned hunters take their time. The quarry defends. An arbitrary time limit ends the combat, and after tea it is someone else's turn. Can anyone say that this is the best way to search out alternatives, weigh experience, assess implications, evaluate assertions? My title “The Government of Reason” is deliberately ambiguous. On the one hand it might mean governing according to the light of reason. This was, of course, the avowed aim of the Enlightenment. The conduct of political life would follow the bright line of reason. On the other hand, the title could mean governing reason, taking control of reason and using it as a weapon. Here we may be forgiven for thinking of Michel Foucault on the use of knowledge as power. The ambiguity of the title is meant to reflect the ambiguity of reality where both alternatives have occurred. Only half of the moral realm has been made the subject of political theory. (shrink)

The bear, says Hierocles, is aware that its head is easily injured, and instinctively uses its paws as a protection. The three following lines in the papyrus are badly damaged– καν εί π.ε … δεηθεί Του | βαλανεíον κρημν | πáλιν ύ;β εθεíησιν ε | αυΤήν. This is followed by a description of what the bear does when it is pursued and comes to a precipice. It inflates itself and trusts to the inflation to break its fall. It is hardly (...) possible to restore the damaged lines. Von Arnim thinks that the sense required is: ‘wenn die Bärin, vom Jäger verfolgt, eines Bades bedarf oder auf ihrer Flucht an einen Abgrund kommt,πáλιν ύπ èψίησιν εαψτήν’ But a sensible bear would hardly think of taking a bath when pursued by the hunter. It might take to the water; but the Greek for this would be somewhat different. As I read the passage, there is no reference to the bear as pursued by the hunter till line 34, where I would read πоιεî δè τò τοιóνδε , since the phrase εί δ υν διοκμéνμ in line 38 is resumptive, and implies that the pursuit must have been alluded to before. But before line 35 H. is only describing what the bear does to protect its head in the ordinary routine of its life when it is not harassed by the hunter. It wants a bath, and finds that it cannot reach the water without clambering down an overhanging bank It will not climb down head foremost, but guards its head by sliding backwards down the bank. As the bear would want its bath because it was hot, it is perhaps not too hazardous to conjecture that some phrase such as xs03F0xs2135ν ει π ε<ζομéν πνíγηι δεμθεíν του β. should find its place in line 31. (shrink)

We argue that the geometry of spacetime is a convention that can be freely chosen by the scientist; no experiment can ever determine this geometry of spacetime, only the behavior of matter in space and time. General relativity is then rewritten in terms of an arbitrary conventional geometry of spacetime in which particle trajectories are determined by forces in that geometry, and the forces determined by fields produced by sources in that geometry. As an example, we consider radial trajectories in (...) the field of a single particle expressed in the spacetime of special relativity. (shrink)